This article suggests a possible approach to analyzing the global history of intelligence testing in light of some recent work in the history of science and science studies. In particular, it uses work in metrology and subaltern studies to develop possible models for the dissemination, appropriation, and transformation of mental testing in the early 20th century. It draws on the accounts presented in the other articles in this collection to substantiate its claims.
The articles assembled in this special issue on the origins and early history of intelligence testing in a number of countries-Italy, Spain, Brazil, and the Soviet Union-do much to expand and reorient the historiography on mental testing away from its rather myopic focus (to this point) on the United States, France, and Great Britain. They demonstrate vividly both the excitement that the new technology of testing generated in certain psychologists and educators around the world, and the variety of projects that could be associated with this technology. They also make very clear the numerous impediments that promoters encountered when trying to institutionalize mental testing as the answer to some perceived social problem or educational project or need or opportunity, as well as the idiosyncratic nature of all of these endeavors. In this comment, I suggest a possible approach to analyzing the global history of intelligence testing in light of some recent work in history of science and science studies, and then examine some of the key features, as I see them, of the stories the authors present taken collectively.
Metrology, Subaltern Studies, and the Intelligence Test
One of the great achievements of late-19th-century electrophysics, Simon Schaffer has argued, was its creation of a "manufactory of ohms," a site where a standardized electrical unit could be produced and converted into a black-boxed instrument capable of being dispatched around the world to regulate electrical practice and the electrical measurements on which it depended (Schaffer, 1992) . Schaffer's story of the ohm does not stand alone. Work during the last two to three decades on the history of metrology (the science of standards and measures) has repeatedly found that Schaffer's basic narrative applies, whether it be to the standardization of the meter, as described by Ken Alder, or of the laboratory rat, as recounted by Karen Rader (Alder, 2002; Rader, 2004) . Various possible standards are proposed, often by rival research groups; technical problems in constructing and making reliable the standard are eventually solved; and the standard that triumphs is then both distributed across a network of relevant practitioners and used to regulate subsequent work in the field. Bruno Latour has, in many ways, embraced this understanding of standardization as one of his central analytics, describing the development of actor networks with centers of calculation that regulate far-flung practices and ensure that there is calibration throughout the system (Latour, 1988) . We can describe this as essentially an imperial story, in which a metropolitan institution defines (and often physically maintains) a standard, and then demands that provincials everywhere adopt that standard if their work is to be taken seriously.
This picture constitutes, I think, one of the main metanarratives that historians of science and other science studies scholars have at our disposal for understanding the development and deployment of scientific instruments and standards. But it is not the only one. A second narrative, drawn, one might say, more from postcolonial studies, emphasizes less the cooptation of the periphery by the center, and more the adoption, adaptation, and repurposing of artifacts and ideas as they circulate between putative metropoles and provinces (Chakrabarty, 2007) . Two very well known examples in science studies of this kind of story are Madeleine Akrich's research on the transfer of technical objects, as she calls them, between Europe and Africa, and Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch's study of the role of the user in shaping the early history of the automobile in rural America (Akrich, 1992; Kline & Pinch, 1996) . Both emphasize that the wishes and designs of producers, including their imagined consumers and the imagined uses of the artifacts, were only one of the factors shaping what could happen when a technical object is moved to a new locale. Instead, the nature of local conditions, the cultural contexts into which the artifacts are introduced, and the needs and interests of those wanting to adopt the artifacts all have powerful influences on what will be adopted and how it will be used. Rather than the center dictating to the periphery and regulating its actions, this narrative emphasizes the plasticity of technoscientific objects and the power of local conditions and actors to remake, either subtly or dramatically, the object being transferred, as it is adapted to its local environment. It is a story less of empire than of evolution, with emphasis on variation and local adaptations.
Both of these metanarratives resonate well with the early history of intelligence testing, particularly the history of the Binet-Simon metric scale of intelligence and its many offspring. Created in France by Alfred Binet and Théodore Simon in the period 1904 -1911, the BinetSimon scale spread widely, most famously (or notoriously) to the United States, but, as the articles in this special issue demonstrate so well, to many other parts of the world as well. In some respects, the story epitomizes the metrological, imperial narrative. From a single metropolitan center, Paris, the measuring instrument journeyed to many parts of the globe, bringing with it the vision of intelligence as a single, measurable entity. Age-graded scales were used to rank populations, norms were created that could either directly or indirectly refer back to the Parisian subjects on which the scale was initially based, and the scale's output, whether "mental age" or, eventually, "IQ" was presumed applicable in all places and to all groups.
On the other hand, importing the BinetSimon or some other mental testing instrument almost always required some sort of local adaptation, if only translating it into the relevant language. And most often, many other transformations were made as well. Provincials, in other words, were rarely content to take the instrument as defined in the metropole and to let its structure discipline their activities. Rather, they engaged with it creatively, transforming elements to fit local needs and contexts. Such a story certainly holds true for the United States, a nation that was as much on the periphery as in the center vis-á-vis Europe well into the 20th century. When the Binet-Simon metric scale came to the United States, though a number of psychologists embraced it quickly, they just as quickly began to change it, adapting the instrument not just to its new language, English, but to its new home as well. And they did so with scant worry about what psychologists in France might think about their endeavors.
Thus, we seem to have two compelling, though rather different, if not contradictory, narratives that we might use to investigate the dissemination of the Binet-Simon metric scale and other mental tests in the first decades of the 20th century. If one foot lay in the imperializing landscape of metrology, of the production of potentially universal standards supervised from metropolitan centers, the other lay just as firmly in the provincializing terrain of evolutionary adaptations and transformations in response to local conditions. At times, those appropriations were guided, though rarely directed, by the approach to mental testing being developed in metropoles such as Paris; at other times, actors may have gained inspiration from developments elsewhere, but quickly turned to the demands of their local contexts when trying to create or refine their own mental measurement instruments or to develop some form of a testing program. As Annette Mülberger (2014, pp. 177-186) wisely counsels in her introduction to this collection of articles, "think of mental testing as psychological activity that circulated through different cultural spaces in the first decades of the 20th century, thereby provoking resistance and assimilation or appropriation" (p. 182).
To understand better the nature of some of these appropriations, assimilations, and resistances, I will provide a quick sketch of the early history of intelligence testing in France, and then look to the developments detailed in these articles to try and illuminate some of the parallels and divergences as mental testing circulated through various places, and for various purposes, in the early 20th century.
Mental Testing in France and Beyond
As is well known, when Alfred Binet commenced work in 1904 on the first version of what would become the metric scale of intelligence, published in 1905, he did so in concert with his appointment to a ministerial commission on children lagging in school (Carson, 2007, Chapter 4) . The scale was conceivedBinet and his colleague Théodore Simon explained at the Fifth International Congress of Psychology in Rome in 1905-as a new means of diagnosing idiocy, imbecility, and feeblemindedness (débilité), and distinguishing these subnormal types of intelligence from normal minds lacking sufficient training (Binet & Simon, 1905a) . Their initial goal was to replace what they deemed the "arbitrary" classificatory methods of doctors and educators with a procedure for defining degrees of intellectual deficit that was more objective, precise, and, above all, scientific (Carson, 2007, Chapter 4) .
To remedy this presumed lack of precision, Binet and Simon developed a series of 30 tests, arranged from simplest to most difficult, that were calibrated through application to "normal" schoolchildren at a series of ages (Binet & Simon, 1905b , 1905c , 1905d . Their goal was to use the performance of these normal children as a standard (barême) that captured some aspect of what it meant to be "normal" and that could be used to analyze deviations from this normal state, in order to diagnose mental impairment. Adhering to a fundamental tenet of French clinical psychology, that the pathological differed only in degree from the normal, Binet imagined the metric scale as a means of determining a precise relation between abnormal states of intelligence and normal intellectual development. In the 1905 scale, the deviations were largely marked in descriptive terms; by the 1908 revision, however, Binet and Simon had developed an explicit procedure for determining a numerical intellectual level, the "niveau mental," and more rigid criteria for a correct response. These changes substantially increased the emphasis on precision and expanded the scale's target population to include normal children as well as those presumed to be of below normal intelligence (Binet & Simon, 1908) .
For all of Binet and Simon's efforts, the reception of the Binet-Simon intelligence scale in France was lukewarm at best. Almost immediately, French physicians proved hostile to a diagnostic technique that apparently challenged their authority, a reaction that pushed Binet to reorient his intelligence work away from medical diagnosis and "toward practical and social questions," as he declared in 1908 (Binet, 1908, p. v) . Although Binet worked assiduously to identify a range of possible uses for the scale and to promote it to everyone from the Ministry of Education to the French Army, the actual uptake of the instrument was modest. Binet's sudden death in 1911 at the age of 54 deprived the scale of its most important champion. While most French psychologists acknowledged that the Binet-Simon was a measuring instrument of some practical value, few found it of more than limited relevance to their own research programs. The orientation of French psychological investigation in the early 20th century was overwhelmingly toward clinical studies of individual pathology or laboratory experimentation on basic psychological functions, not toward the practical applications of psychological science to social problems. Moreover, most institutions remained content with time-honored methods for identifying the mentally subnormal (the arrièrés), the mentally superior, and those best suited for certain types of training or occupations (Carson, 2007, Chapters 4 and 7) .
Outside of France, the response to the BinetSimon metric scale and to other mental tests, as we can see well in this collection of articles, varied widely in some ways, and was remarkably similar in others. In the United States, psychologist Henry H. Goddard's enthusiasm for the 1908 Binet-Simon scale, and his success with it at his Vineland institution for the feebleminded, soon initiated a real vogue for testing, at least among a small cadre of mostly young academic psychologists. Lewis M. Terman and Robert M. Yerkes, most famously, but also Hubert G. Childs, Edmund B. Huey, and Fred Kuhlmann, among others, experimented with the scale during the 1910s, each making changes in it to fit their needs, the purposes they imagined for the test, and the problems they encountered with the scale when trying it out on sample populations. This period of local experimentation and adaptation largely came to an end with Terman's development of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale in 1916 and Yerkes's of the Yerkes-Bridges Point Scale in 1915, followed by the creation during World War I of the Army Alpha group-administered intelligence test and the testing of 1.75 million soldiers during the war (Carson, 2007, Chapter 5) . In the postwar period, American mental testing began to be envisioned and prosecuted on a mass scale in education and industry, promoted by the large number of mental testers trained during the war and practiced using instruments based typically on the Stanford-Binet or Army Alpha (Carson, 2007, Chapter 7) .
In Italy, Spain, Brazil, and the Soviet Union, we find some striking parallels to the story of the uptake of mental testing in the United States, if also some important differences. In each nation, testing typically began out of the enthusiasm of one individual or a very small group for investigating the possibility of creating or adapting a diagnostic instrument, most typically for the purpose of classifying children feared to have some kind of mental pathology. Thus, we learn from Cicciola et al. (2014, pp. 223-236) that, in Rome, the work of Sante De Sanctis was crucial. He created his own mental test, the Reactives, at about the same time as Binet and Simon created their metric scale, and for a similar purpose, to grade the degree of mental insufficiency of the children in his asylum. In Barcelona, Mülberger et al. (2014, pp. 206 -222) explain, primary school teacher Llorenç Cabós i Badia was a key figure in the attempt to establish testing there. He developed a version of the Yerkes-Bridges Point Scale in the early 1920s and experimented on children in his primary school, though, for him, the aim was less to diagnose mental deficit than to help create an individualized pedagogy that would be attuned to the particular capabilities of each student.
Mental testing also made its first appearance in Brazil during the 1920s, according to Jacó-Vilela (2014, pp. 237-248) , through the efforts of a small group of psychologists and pedagogues in the Brazilian Mental Hygiene League, which began to advocate for the use of mental tests to reveal possible mental abnormalities among schoolchildren. Here, too, new tests were created, and existing ones imported and adapted to Brazilian conditions. For example Isaías Alves translated and revised the BinetSimon-Burt intelligence scale for the purpose of assessing the intelligence levels and presumptive futures of schoolchildren in Bahia. Finally, Leopoldoff (2014, pp. 187-205) shows how a few Russian figures in the overlapping fields of psychology, psychiatry, and pedagogy were instrumental in the development of mental testing in the Soviet Union. She particularly highlights the work of the influential Russian pedologist Alexandre Nečajev, who developed his own assessment instrument in the 1920s by combining elements from the Binet-Simon with a psychological profiles test developed by fellow Russian, neuropathologist G. J. Rossolimo. Although Rossolimo's work was oriented toward identifying mental pathologies, Nečajev went in a different direction, seeking to illuminate individual variations in performance, while trying to show that virtually every young child could attain the same level of basic academic skills after successful school training.
Each of the individuals or groups who took up the project of mental testing in their respective local contexts faced two kinds of challenges: first, what sort of instrument would they use to make their assessments and how closely would they tie the output of that instrument to measuring tools being used elsewhere; and second, how would they argue for the importance and social value of testing and make the case for its establishment on a broader scale? In some ways, the range of answers to the first question was quite broad. Most, includnig Goddard and Alves, began with an already established instrument, such as the Binet-Simon, and then translated it into the relevant language and used it either directly or with modifications. A few, such as de Sanctis, developed their own scales, perhaps drawing inspiration from other methods, but mostly responding to the immediate issues they were seeking to address. In all of these cases, experimentation with the form and content of the tests was much more the rule than the exception. Even those whose knowledge of mental testing was mostly self-taught, such as Cabós, felt justified using a scale that they had created or modified to reflect local circumstances and goals, be it the kinds of children they would test or the purposes of the testing itself. Routinely, psychologists and pedagogues changed tasks, altered acceptable answers, and generally remade the scales to fit their own conceptions of what an accurate measurement of intelligence would look like, given the population they were assessing.
What virtually no researcher seems to have done is to worry very long or hard about whether the alterations in the test meant that its results were no longer "the same" as those produced where the test had originated. They seemed, in other words, completely unfazed about decoupling their instruments, and thus their measurements, from those produced in Paris or in any other metropole. Even the American psychologists who appropriated and transformed the Binet-Simon gave scant attention to how their results correlated with Binet's data on Parisian children. And in none of the other locales examined in this collection of articles did the question of commensurability with measurements taken elsewhere seem to be of much concern (Espeland & Stevens, 1998) . Eventually in the United States, there would be a strong push to ensure that new tests would be validated in part by their correlation with existing standards, such as the Stanford-Binet. But the notion that there needed to be translocal measures, a key tenet of modern metrology, seemed to carry little weight anywhere that mental testing was being prosecuted, at least in the first few decades of its existence.
Part of the explanation may be that with Binet's death, there was no central figure in France with sufficient interest and authority to demand that the measurements remain commensurate-that the Parisian standard must prevail. Moreover, the kinds of problems that the metric scale was meant to address were in many ways local ones: Which students needed special education, which individuals would benefit from advanced training, and so forth? There was little social need to have these determinations be able to travel and to accord with one another. In that sense, early mental testing might best be seen, as Mülberger (2014) suggests in her introduction, as a series of geographically specific and culturally inflected activities whose primary aim was to respond to local needs and possibilities as understood by the individuals or small groups promoting the testing project.
One might suppose, in this situation of responding to local needs, that the success of these projects would have been quite high. But, except for the American efforts, the other striking characteristic of most of these early attempts to establish mental testing programs is that they generally failed to last. Certain individual psychologists in France remained interested in intelligence testing throughout the 1920s and 1930s, but such testing was never institutionalized, even for the identification of children who might be of subnormal intelligence. De Sanctis had some success in Italy establishing testing as part of a clinical assessment of individual children, but Cicciola et al. (2014) make clear that there was significant opposition to testing among both psychologists and pedagogues, and concluded that "the use of intelligence tests remained limited in pre1950s Italy" (p. 229). The story in Spain was roughly similar, according to Mülberger et al. (2014) . Cabós had a certain amount of success in Barcelona in advocating for testing in order to highlight the new scientific approach to pedagogy that he and other teachers were promoting, as well as to reveal the intellectual merits of their students, particularly working-class children. That said, the efforts were spotty and sporadic, and no "efficient, wide-ranging testing program like Terman's" in the United States was established.
In Brazil, too, as Jacó-Vilela (2014) explains, the context of scientific pedagogy was crucial to the attempt to introduce mental testing, but the results, even with support of institutions such as the Brazilian Mental Hygiene League, were mixed: Some testing was initiated, but no largescale program was created, in part because of tensions between the use of the tests to stratify the school population into different categories of student (and thus often to perpetuate racial and socioeconomic divisions) versus the desire to create a broadly inclusive educational system. Only in the Soviet Union, according to Leopoldoff (2014) , does it appear that testing might have gone beyond the initiatives of a few psychologists and pedologists to become a wellinstitutionalized program, part of the reinvention of the Soviet educational system after the revolution. But for all of the attempts to use testing to underscore the successes of the educational system, by the early 1930s, key figures in the Soviet bureaucracy, eventually including Stalin, turned against intelligence testing and it was summarily banned in 1936.
All of the mental testers saw themselves as addressing local needs or problems, and doing so in the most scientific and up-to-date manner possible. And so why so little success? What does this tell us about the testing project as a whole? One clear lesson to draw from these examples considered in toto is to recognize just how anomalous the U.S. experience was. Only in the United States, and to a degree in Britain, did intelligence testing become a major preoccupation of psychologists and educators, and a significant presence in the social and cultural landscape during the 1920s and 1930s. Although, in many nations, the problem of identifying possibly mentally impaired children or the desire to create modern, scientific educational and industrial systems loomed large, the range of impediments to testing moving out of the laboratory and into the mainstream were formidable.
In the United States, the combination of rapidly expanding secondary education with a large supply of mental testers (coming out of the military testing program and the many psychology departments producing graduates in the postwar period) and the enormous publicity given to testing in the United States in the wake of the Army's World War I testing program, created a set of material conditions that doubtless aided substantially the efforts of those promoting testing for it to be considered a valuable response to a range of social issues. Testing's advocates also were confronted with a culture in which worries about the so-called "menace of the feebleminded" and infatuation with eugenics were widespread, at least among certain powerful groups, and in which the turn to science as an important means of addressing social and industrial problems was embraced by many. Some of these conditions certainly existed in other localities, but the United States may have been one of the few in which a sufficient number of cultural, material, and institutional factors could come together to make mental testing appear to be a technology worth pursuing on a large scale.
Conclusions
By provincializing the U.S. experience, therefore, we can much better see how atypical it was, and thus begin to ask new questions about the introduction and experimentation with mental testing in other locales. The articles assembled in this special issue begin to do just that, illuminating the range of factors that affected whether testing would be pursued, for what purposes, and with what success. One would be wise not to completely ignore the metrological dimensions of these projects; after all, most, in one form or another, used the technique of age stratification as a way to assess intelligence and many assumed a vision of intelligence-singular, hierarchical, unidimensional-embodied in the Binet-Simon scale. Nonetheless, the variety of approaches and the power of local conditions to shape what testing meant in its various contexts are also vividly apparent. Mental testing in the early 20th century was not one thing, but a collection of practices and procedures and purposes and contexts, some shared with others working in the testing field and some idiosyncratic to the specific initiatives being pursued.
